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Abstract
This paper studies whether civic capital (those persistent shared beliefs and values
that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable
activities) acts an effective restraint against opportunistic behavior in transactions by
looking at the firm-level degree of service outsourcing in Italy. Our results show that
firms tend to outsource more services in areas where civic capital is higher. We claim
that the rise in the propensity to engage in transactions with outside service suppliers
stems from the decrease in opportunism between the parties involved. We consider
a dynamic specification which allows to disentangle state dependence of service out-
sourcing from firm-level heterogeneity, and we use historical instruments to address
the potential endogeneity of civic capital.
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Non-technical summary
Understanding the determinants of firm boundaries is a fundamental concern in economics.
Over the last 40 years, important theoretical contributions have highlighted the role of in-
complete contracts and transaction costs for the firms’ decision of whether to produce a given
input in-house or to purchase it from external suppliers. In a nutshell, these theories sustain
that if contracts are not fully enforceable by third parties and unforeseen contingencies oc-
cur, agents have an incentive to renege on initial agreements and behave opportunistically,
something which reduces the efficacy of written agreements and creates contracting costs.
Between in-house production and external sourcing, firms are expected to choose the form
of production that minimizes these costs.
The present paper analyzes the role of informal institutions, proxied by the stock of
local civic capital, for the firms’ organization of production. Civic capital is defined as those
persistent shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the
pursuit of socially valuable activities The importance of civic capital for the firm’s make-
or-buy decision resides in the fact that the underlying civic values and beliefs attenuate
individual opportunistic behavior. Since the likelihood of opportunism decreases with the
stock of civic capital, we expect the incidence of contractual hazards in economic transac-
tions to be lower in more civic areas. As a consequence, the organization of production
should vary with the stock of civic capital characterizing the area where it is located. More
precisely, contractual hazards are more easily dealt with in integrated production process-
eses. Consequently, outsourcing should be lower in areas where civic capital is low (and
opportunism is high) and more pronounced where civic capital abounds.
Using Italian firm level data, this paper tests whether the decision to outsource the
production of service inputs is sensitive to the stock of civic capital of the province where
the firm is located. Service transactions are well suited to our task. Contracts governing
service transactions tend to be highly incomplete, as services are aﬄicted by measurement
and hold-up problems as well as hazards related to asymmetric information between provider
and client. Moreover, services are predominantly acquired on the local market which makes
the effect of local civic capital on service outsourcing more straightforward to identify. The
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empirical results confirm that firms’ intensity to purchase services from external providers
increases with the stock of provincial civic capital.
3
1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of firm boundaries is a fundamental concern in economics.
Starting with Coase (1937) andWilliamson (1975, 1979), important theoretical contributions
have highlighted the role of incomplete contracts and transaction costs for the firms’ decision
of whether to produce a given input in-house or to purchase it from external suppliers.
When contracts are not fully enforceable by third parties and unforeseen contingencies occur,
agents have an incentive to behave opportunistically on initial agreements, thus reducing the
efficacy of written agreements and creating contracting costs. Between in-house production
and external sourcing, firms are expected to choose the form of production that minimizes
costs, taking duly into account transaction costs.
At the same time, a well developed literature documents that civic capital or soci-
etal trust have far reaching implications for economic outcomes in general (Putnam, 1993;
Guiso et al., 2011; Algan and Cahuc, 2014; Tabellini, 2010) and the behavior of firms in
particular (Bloom et al., 2012). The key merit of the underlying values and beliefs that
account for the stock of civic capital is that they attenuate narrow-minded self interested
behavior. The propensity of individuals to engage in opportunistic behavior is thus lower
in areas where civic values are more widespread.
In this paper, we combine the key insights from these two strands of literature and
test empirically whether civic capital alters the boundaries of the firm: if the degree of
opportunism decreases with the stock of civic capital, we expect the incidence of contrac-
tual hazards to be lower in more civic areas. As a consequence, the firm organization of
production should vary with the stock of civic capital characterizing the area where it is
located. More precisely, according to the transaction cost literature (Williamson, 1975,
1985), contractual hazards are more easily dealt with in integrated production processes.
Consequently, others things equal, we should observe less outsourcing in areas where civic
capital is low (as the propensity to behave opportunistically is higher) and more outsourcing
where civic values are widespread.
Employing a large Italian firm-level data set, we investigate the relationship between the
firms’ degree of service outsourcing and the stock of civic capital in the province where the
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firm is located. The choice of using services rather than raw material inputs is dictated by
several reasons. First, the transactions involving service purchases are particularly sensitive
to contractual incompleteness, because they tend to be aﬄicted by measurement and hold-
up problems, and are often plagued by asymmetric information. This makes them a suitable
input to look at for our purposes. Second, services are predominantly purchased in the local
market (Schwartz, 1993; Ono, 2003; Merino and Rodrand, 2007). This makes the effect of
local civic capital on service outsourcing more straightforward to identify, as both the buyer
and the provider tend to be located in the same area, and hence they operate surrounded
by the same level of civicness.
Our empirical results show that the stock of civic capital in a given province influences
firm-level intensity to purchase services from external providers. In particular, we find that
firms located in more civic provinces outsource on average more services. The results are
robust against the inclusion of relevant firm-level and provincial controls, such as the qual-
ity of formal contracting institutions. Our empirical strategy carefully addresses concerns
related to omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, we consider a dynamic
specification which allows to disentangle state dependence of service outsourcing from firm-
level heterogeneity, while retaining the identification of time-invariant regressors, and we
estimate it by System GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). We think this is a key aspect of
our paper, since cross-sectional analyses dealing with an inherently dynamic phenomenon
such as firm organizational structure may suffer from various sources of misspecification. At
the same time, System GMM provides a set up where the effect of a time-invariant variable
such as civic capital can still be identified. To the best of our knowledge, this article is the
first to look at the relationship between firm organizational structure and, broadly defined,
institutional setting by means of a fully-fledged dynamic model.1 We also rely on some
historical excluded instruments and we document that the effect is unlikely to be driven
by measurement error or reversed causation. Our results prove that informal institutions
such as civic values and beliefs determine the boundaries of the firm. The fact that civic
1Papers based on cross-sectional analyses in this literature are Acemoglu et al. (2009), Bloom et al.
(2012), and Macchiavello (2012). See below for more discussion about them.
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capital increases service outsourcing of firms strongly suggest that societal values and beliefs
reduce the propensity of the parties involved in a transaction to defect. In this way, our
analysis confirms Williamson’s hypothesis that “societal culture” can improve the efficacy
of contracts by reducing opportunism (Williamson, 1993).
Our paper contributes to the literature analyzing the institutional determinants of ver-
tical integration. We find a direct and positive effect of the institutional setting on out-
sourcing: civic capital shapes firms’ organization of production even after controlling for
key aspects of institutional quality, such as the efficiency of the judiciary and the level
of financial development. This result complements the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2009)
and Macchiavello (2012), who show that the relationship between institutional development
(contracting costs, financial development) and the firms’ decision to vertically integrate is
knotty. Acemoglu et al. (2009) find that the quality of contracting institutions has no direct
effect on the degree of vertical integration. However, contracting institutions matter once
industry heterogeneity is taken into account, since the efficiency of the judiciary brings more
vertical integration in industries that are more capital-intensive. They also find greater ver-
tical integration in countries that have both greater contracting costs and greater financial
development. Macchiavello (2012) analyzes the interaction between industrial structure (in
particular the industry’s firm size distribution), financial development and vertical integra-
tion. For manufacturing industries, he shows that the degree of vertical integration decreases
with financial development in industries where small firms are important. We stress that
while these papers focus on the role of formal institutions, and find basically no evidence
of a direct effect on vertical integration, in our paper we investigate the role of an informal
institution such as civic capital, and find compelling evidence of a direct effect. Another
peculiarity of our approach is the analysis of the sourcing decision of a specific input such as
services (while these papers look at other, more general, measures of vertical integration).
Next, our paper is also related to the literature looking at the determinants of service out-
sourcing. Several factors that influence the propensity of firms to purchase services from ex-
ternal providers have been identified, ranging from labor cost savings (Abraham and Taylor,
1996), ICT investment (Abramovsky and Griffith, 2006), firm size (Abraham and Taylor,
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1996; Merino and Rodrand, 2007), demand fluctuations (Abraham and Taylor, 1996), mar-
ket share (Galdon-Sanchez et al., 2015) to the characteristics of the local market, in partic-
ular its size (Ono, 2007). None of these studies however focuses on how cultural traits, such
as those embedded in civicness, affects service outsourcing.
Finally, our results complement the findings of Bloom et al. (2012) and Bu¨rker and Minerva
(2014) on the relationship between trust and civic capital and the size of private organiza-
tions. The fact that civic capital increases service outsourcing could bring a reduction in
size, because the firm sources to external suppliers some activities. This notwithstanding,
results in Bloom et al. (2012) and Bu¨rker and Minerva (2014) show that there are other
mechanisms at work that ensure that the total effect of civic capital on average size is still
positive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the
conceptual framework and derives some testable implications. Section 3 describes the data
and the variables employed. In section 4 we lay out the estimation strategy while section
5 describes the empirical results. In section 6 we employ historical instruments to address
endogeneity concerns. Section 7 draws some conclusions.
2 Civic capital and service outsourcing: conceptual
framework
For most economic transactions, it is virtually impossible to set up written agreements that
specify contingencies for all possible future states. Rather, contracts are often incomplete
and their enforceability by third parties is limited, something which gives the contracting
parties an opportunity to renege on initial agreements and, as a consequence, undermines
the efficacy of contracts. The fact that incomplete contracts involve contractual hazards
ex-post is a direct consequence of opportunistic behavior on the part of the agents involved
in the transaction. More generally, the transaction cost literature (Williamson, 1975, 1985)
states that opportunism is a necessary condition for the emergence of contractual hazards.
If opportunistic behavior, defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1996),
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were absent the efficacy of contracts would be guaranteed even if the underlying agreement
was not enforceable by third parties. In such a setting, it would be sufficient to specify
automatic adaptation clauses that apply when the conditions require an update of the
written agreement.
In this study, we consider a specific case of how variations in opportunistic behavior
shape the efficacy of contracts. We analyze how the firm decision to outsource or not
services varies with the degree of opportunistic behavior characterizing the environment
in which the transaction takes place. Studying the sourcing decision of services, rather
than material inputs, has two advantages. First, we argue that the incidence of contract
incompleteness is particularly strong in service transactions. As services are intangible and
often non-standardized, the responsibilities and duties for each contracting party are hard to
define and penalties for defection difficult to specify. Moreover, service transactions are likely
to be aﬄicted by hold-up problems if the provider has to acquire specific physical or human
capital to meet the needs of the client. Similarly, it might be that the client has to align its
work setting in order to allow the provision of the service or to assist effectively the provider
(DeBandt, 1996). Contractual frictions further increase due to measurement difficulties.
As services lack well-defined technical standards it is generally difficult to measure quality
or simply to compare it across different suppliers. Therefore, it is cumbersome to write
a contract that specifies ex-ante clauses for each possible contingency that might emerge
during the course of the contractual relationship. Rather, the contract that governs a
service transaction is likely to be incomplete and requires ex-post adaptation to unforeseen
contingencies.
The second advantage of studying transactions involving services resides in their limited
tradability. This is an important aspect, as our variable of interest is civic capital, an
inverse measure of the opportunistic attitude that characterizes the environment in which
a transaction takes place. Hence, the effect is accurately identified when both transacting
partners are located in the same area. In the case of service transactions this condition is
likely to be fulfilled. The degree of spatial proximity between clients and providers is high
for services such as repairing and maintenance, cleaning, or security that require repeated
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personal interaction between the client and the provider (DeBandt, 1996).2 Even when the
headquarters of the provider are located far from the client, the workers directly involved
in the provision of the service have to reside close to the buyer.3 Differently from services,
raw materials are more tradable, and hence the supplier’s location can be far away from the
buyer’s. The assignment of an appropriate level of opportunism is puzzling in the case of
raw materials transactions, and hence they constitute a less suitable object of analysis.
We associate the degree of opportunism in a given area to the stock of civic capital
in the province where the firm is located. There are good reasons to believe that civic
capital is a good proxy for the behavioral traits that inform about opportunistic behavior
in economic transactions. Civic capital is defined as “those persistent shared beliefs and
values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valu-
able activities” (Guiso et al., 2011). Put differently, it captures all those societal values
and beliefs that mitigate the free-rider problem, a genuine form of opportunistic behavior.
Therefore, we conjecture that the stock of civic capital increases the efficacy of contracts
as agents have a lower probability to defect. The concept of civic capital comes close to
what Williamson terms “societal culture”. He emphasizes that societal culture increases
the efficacy of contracts, and hence shapes the organization of production, as it limits the
incidence of opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1996).4
What are the implications of the reduction in contracting costs brought about by civic
2According to the Survey of Industrial and Service firms, conducted by the Bank of Italy in 2007, 2/3
of Italian firms purchase services exclusively from providers that are located in the same region. Even if
we work with a smaller geographic partition (on average there are 5 provinces per region) this evidence
confirms that service tradability is limited.
3For example, think to cleaning workers employed by a large service firm. The headquarters of the
service firm may be located everywhere in Italy, but the workers directly hired to perform the daily cleaning
operations should reside close to buyer.
4Relational contracts too have been found to affect the firms’ integration decision (Baker et al., 2002),
but they operate differently from civic capital. Relational contracts are sustained by the value of future
relationships; that is, agents have a material interest not to renege on contractual agreements even if they
are not enforceable by third parties. In contrast, the behavioral traits underlying civic capital deviate from
strict self-interested behavior. Here, it is a given set of societal values and beliefs that attenuate opportunism
and hence ensure cooperation, even if the transaction is not going to be repeated in the future.
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capital for the firms’ intensity of service outsourcing? Transaction costs economics posits
that if contractual hazards are acute provision is more efficiently achieved within firms, as
its hierarchical structure is better able to solve disputes that may arise during the course of
production. On the other hand, if contractual difficulties are small a product is efficiently
provided by an independent supplier and then exchanged through a market transaction. The
empirical literature has confirmed this prediction. Products that are complex and aﬄicted
by hold-up are produced by integrated firms (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007).
Based on these insights, we aim at testing the following hypothesis: firms located in
areas with low endowments of civic capital acquire less services from external suppliers. In
these locations, opportunism is pervasive, and firms tend to rely more on the internalization
of service provision. Conversely, where civic capital abounds transaction costs are lower, as
agents have a lower propensity to renege on initial agreements and behave opportunistically.
In this case, relatively more transactions concerning services are realized through arm’s
length relationships, so we should observe greater service outsourcing.
3 Data and variables
3.1 Firm-level variables
The primary source of information is AIDA, a firm-level dataset administered by the Bureau
van Dijk. AIDA is a commercial dataset which provides information on balance sheets and
profit and loss statements for hundreds of thousands of Italian businesses. From this dataset
we extract information on a number of variables including value added, sales, the number of
workers, total tangible fixed assets, service purchases, firm age. We also retain information
about firms’ geographic localization and industry. An important advantage of the AIDA
dataset is that it includes firms operating in all industries. This implies that our results
apply to the whole spectrum of economic activity.5
5The only industries that we exclude are: Public administration (NACE rev 1.1. code 75), Education (80),
Health and social services (85), Unions, political parties and other organizations (91), Private households
(95, 96, 97) and Extraterritorial organizations (99).
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Analyzing service outsourcing with information collected at the firm-level rather than at
the plant-level might be inaccurate if a firm runs multiple establishments. However, to the
extent that decisions on service outsourcing are taken at the central firm headquarters, and
are not decentralized to individual plants, there is no error due to firm-level aggregation.
Under centralization, the degree of outsourcing of all the plants belonging to a given firm will
be decided by the managers located at the central office and, according to our framework,
it will be affected by the level of civic capital of the central office’s province. Moreover, if
sourcing decisions are made at individual plants the use of firm-level data is still adequate
as long as plants and headquarters are located in the same province, since the different units
are influenced by the same level of provincial civic spirit. The only case where firm-level
data are problematic is when the decision to outsource services is decentralized at the plant
level and plants are located outside of the province of the firm headquarters.6
The degree of service outsourcing at the firm-level is measured as follows. The item
dedicated to services in the profit and loss statement informs about the total expenditures
paid by the firm for external service provision.7 Since items recorded in the income statement
are collected for accounting purposes, the purchase of specific services is not singled out,
and we have only information on the total amount of purchased services. Service purchases
are then divided by the total amount of sales in order to retrieve a measure of service
outsourcing, that we call Purchased Service Intensity (PSI hereafter). This measure of
service outsourcing has been employed before in the literature (Abramovsky and Griffith,
2006; Go¨rg and Hanley, 2011). PSI contributes to value added over sales, which is a standard
measure of the overall degree of vertical integration.8 The ratio of value added over sales
captures how much of a firm’s production is carried out within the firm boundaries. Leaving
aside the variation in inventories to simplify notation, value added can be written as
VA = Sales − Services −Material Inputs − Other non-financial non-labor costs (1)
6We are not the first to employ firm-level data to investigate the determinants of outsourcing. See
Li and Lu (2009) for a paper about input outsourcing in China and Merino and Rodrand (2007) who analyze
service outsourcing of Spanish firms.
7In Appendix A we give a detailed description of the kind of services that enter this item.
8The classical reference is Adelman (1955), and a more recent application is Macchiavello (2012).
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and then, dividing by sales, we get
VA
Sales
= 1− PSI − PII −
Other non-financial non-labor costs
Sales
(2)
where PII is Purchased (Material) Inputs Intensity. Consequently, the firm overall degree
of vertical integration, measured by value added over sales, can be decomposed in three
parts: PSI, which measures the contribution of the purchase of services on the market to
the firm’s degree of integration; PII, which measures the contribution of the purchase of
material inputs on the market to the firm’s degree of integration; a residual term, which
is related to the decision to purchase on the market other types of inputs. In this paper
we focus on the effect that civic capital exerts on firm-level vertical integration through the
purchase of services. For completeness, we are also going to assess the effect of civic capital
on the overall degree of vertical integration (value added over sales).
After removing outliers and observations with abnormal values, we end up with a sample
consisting of more than 300,000 firms and almost 900,000 observations spanning the years
2001-2007.9 In Table 1 there are descriptive statistics. On average, the amount of purchased
services equals 18.4% of firm sales, while the median value of PSI is slightly larger (20.1%).
Figure 1 shows average PSI across provinces. Overall, the pattern suggests that there is
substantial geographic variation in business service outsourcing. Firms located in Northern
Italy outsource more services than businesses in the South of the country. If we look at the
four largest metropolitan areas of the country (Rome, Milan, Naples and Turin) average
PSI of firms in the provinces of Rome (18.9%), Milan (22.6%), and Turin (21.1%) is higher
than the nationwide average. This is in line with Ono (2007) who finds that agglomeration
economies favor service outsourcing of firms. An interesting exception in this regard is the
province of Naples. The average PSI of firms located in this province equals 12.7%, which is
a value substantially lower than in other agglomerated areas and in Italy as a whole. This is
surprising, as the province is the third largest of the country and has the highest population
density. At the same time, this evidence is supportive of our idea that low levels of civicness
9Firms with negative values for variables such as service purchases, sales, employees, fixed assets, age
are excluded. Moreover, observations whose value of PSI is larger than the 99.5th percentile of the PSI
distribution are dropped from the regressions.
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may hinder service outsourcing, since the province of Naples has the lowest endowment of
civic capital in Italy according to our measures.
Figure 2 shows that the geographic pattern of PSI shown in Figure 1 is not driven by
the spatial sorting of industries with higher average PSI in the Center-North: even after
removing the variation in PSI that is explained by industry affiliation, service outsourcing
is still higher in the North of the country.10 Besides a pronounced North-South gap, the
graph suggests that PSI is highest in the areas with the greatest endowment of civic capital
(Center-North of the country).
3.2 Measurement of civic capital
We quantify the stock of civic capital in a given province by three proxies, namely electoral
turnout in referenda, blood donations in 2000, and volunteering in non-profit organizations
in 2002, with the latter two variables being standardized by population.11 These variables
are standard measures for civic capital in the literature (Guiso et al., 2004; Buonanno et al.,
2009; de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2010). The motivation to use them as proxies descends from
the following reasoning. Individuals that donate blood, vote in referenda, or volunteer in
non-profit organizations make an effort without receiving any personal or pecuniary compen-
sation. Individuals who pursue these activities deviate from narrow-minded self-interested
behavior and express a concern for the common good. Therefore, these activities can be
considered as an expression of those societal values and beliefs prevailing in the local area
that sustain cooperation. This is precisely the behavioral trait civic capital aims to capture.
The incidence of these activities at the local level informs about the strength of cooperative
values and beliefs in a given province. Obviously, each of these proxies is only an imper-
fect measure of civic capital. In order to purge these proxies of noise, we extract the first
principal component. As expected, we find a strong common pattern in the data. All three
proxies are highly correlated and the eigenvalue of the first principal component is 2.48 while
10Specifically, Figure 2 shows average provincial residuals obtained from regressing the log of PSI on the
full set of 3-digit industry dummies.
11A complete description of the variables is provided in the appendix.
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the associated eigenvector explains 75% of the total variance.
Figure 3 shows the geographic variation of civic capital across Italian provinces when
measured by the first principal component. The map confirms the well-established North-
South divide in the endowment of civic capital. Provinces in the Centre-North have a high
stock of civic capital whereas the endowment of civic capital in the South is considerably
lower. Comparing the geographic distribution of civic capital with average provincial PSI,
net of industry effects, in Figure 2 reveals striking similarities. The sharp North-South
gap in the endowment of civic capital coincides almost perfectly with the spatial pattern
of PSI. Moreover, the Central-Northern regions with the highest PSI are those where the
stock of civic capital is the largest. The analogy between the two maps provides strong
visual evidence of a positive relationship between civic capital and the extent of service
outsourcing.
In section 6 we use historical variables of civic capital as instruments. The first measure
is average electoral turnout in elections during the period 1919-1921. The second historical
measure is membership in mutual aid societies in 1873, standardized by population. These
mostly urban associations served craftsmen and artisans as a form of insurance against
economic and social calamities. Both variables are available at the regional level.12 The
last historical instrument delves even deeper into history. According to Putnam (1993),
the differences in civic capital across Italy were determined by different political regimes
prevailing at the beginning of the second millennium. In particular, he stresses the role
of free-city states that emerged in the Northern part of the country for the accumulation
of civic capital. Based on information provided in Guiso et al. (2008), we count for each
province the number of cities that were recorded free-city states in the year 1300.
3.3 Control variables
In the regressions, we use control variables that capture relevant characteristics of the firm as
well as local attributes of the province where the firm is located. First, the firm capital stock
(total tangible fixed assets) and the number of employees are included. The two factors of
12For a detailed description consult Putnam (1993).
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production are important controls, as they tend to influence firm-level demand in services.
For example, the larger the stock of machinery, the greater the expenditure for services like
repair and maintenance. At the same time, the stocks of capital and labor are proxy for
the the existence of economies of scale in internal service provision (Abraham and Taylor,
1996). Larger firms realize economies of scale in in-house production of services which make
service outsourcing less attractive. The age of the firm is also included.
At the local level, we employ the size of the service market, calculated as the total number
of service workers employed in each province in the years from 2001 to 2007. When a firm
in the sample belongs to the service sector, we subtract its size from the overall number of
service workers in the local area. The decision of the firm to outsource a given input depends
on the search costs for finding the appropriate supplier (Grossman and Helpman, 2002).
This is particularly important in the case of services which are typically less standardized
and require a high level of customization. Greater local availability of service providers
reduces search costs and improves the match between the client and the supplier. Moreover,
the size of the local service market controls for the effect of agglomeration on contractual
hazards. For example, in a buyer-supplier relationship, the threat of holding-up the contract
partner is less severe in agglomerated areas, due to the high number of potential alternative
buyers (Helsley and Strange, 2007). Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the
size of the local service market and the extent of service outsourcing of firms.
Next, we account for the quality of formal contracting institutions, which is an important
determinant of contracting costs. We measure the performance of contracting institutions at
the local level by the average number of days it takes for a civil proceeding to be completed in
the tribunals located in the province.13 Consequently, service outsourcing should be higher in
those provinces where proceedings are shorter. We also include the number of bank branches,
normalized by population. As in Benfratello et al. (2008), we posit that the number of bank
branches is related to the local degree of financial development. Financial development, in
turn, may be correlated to PSI trough a number of channels. It could promote the birth of
13In some province there is more than one tribunal. We calculate the average for each province over all
courts located in the province.
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innovative suppliers providing specialized services, thus increasing outsourcing. By inducing
firm entry and hence the degree of competition, financial development may drive smaller,
non-integrated firms out of the market, thereby increasing the equilibrium level of vertical
integration. Alternatively, given that larger firms are more vertically integrated, the fact
that financial development increases competition could also reduce the average degree of
vertical integration in an industry: more intense competition and hence lower profits reduce
the growth of firms and their size (Macchiavello, 2012). As service industries tend to be
skill-intensive, another variable which can be linked to the availability of a large set of service
varieties is the number of skilled workers. This variable is measured by the share of the
provincial population holding a university degree.
4 Econometric specification
In the basic setup, we assess the impact of civic capital on PSI by focusing on the following
static model specification:
lnPSIi,j,s,t = α0 + α1CCj +X
′
i,tβ + α2 lnSj,t + Z
′
jδ + γr + γs + γt + ǫi,j,s,t (3)
where PSIi,j,s,t is the purchased service intensity of firm i in province j, 3-digit industry s, at
time t; CCj is the variable of main interest, i.e. the stock of civic capital in province j. Xi,t
is a vector of time-varying firm level controls, which include number of employees, capital
stock, and firm age. As for the controls at the province level, Sj,t is the time-varying size
of the local service market, while the vector Zj collects time-invariant provincial covariates,
namely the length of trials, the stock of human capital, and financial development. Both
the dependent variable and the regressors are log-transformed, with the exception of the
principal component. We control for specific features at the regional level through a set of
20 regional dummy variables, γr, to minimize the impact of unobserved geographic hetero-
geneity on PSI. Moreover, the equation includes a full set of 3-digit industry dummies, γs,
that account for systematic differences in service outsourcing across industries, and a full set
of time dummies, γt, that capture common time effects. At this stage, all the explanatory
variables, including the stock of civic capital, are assumed to be strictly exogenous. The
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static model is estimated by pooled OLS over the years 2001 through 2007. Unobserved
heterogeneity is expected to be adequately controlled for by the set of regional, sector and
time dummies. The standard errors are made robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the province level, as required by the inclusion of aggregate regressors (Moulton, 1990).
Since service purchases from external providers are likely affected by past decisions of
the firm, thus possibly inducing high persistence, we also analyse the dynamic nature of
outsourcing by means of a suitable econometric strategy. Hence, we turn to a dynamic
model specification which allows to disentangle state dependence of PSI, through the lagged
dependent variable, from firm-level heterogeneity, through the inclusion of individual time
invariant effects. The dynamic model we consider is the following:
lnPSIi,j,s,t = α0 + α1 lnPSIi,j,s,t−1 + α2CCj +X
′
i,tβ + α3 lnSj,t + Z
′
jδ + µi + γt + ǫi,j,s,t (4)
where the µi are the time-invariant individual effects capturing firm-level unobserved het-
erogeneity constant over time, and the lagged dependent variable PSIi,j,s,t−1 enters among
the regressors. Common time effects are captured by γt, a full set of year dummies. All
non-binary variables are log-transformed, with the exception of the principal component.
In such a dynamic specification the lagged dependent variable is endogenous due to
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Furthermore, the one-way fixed effect estimator would
suffer from the Nickell (1981) bias due to the correlation between the lagged regressor and
the error term, induced by the within-group transformation; the fixed effect estimator would
also prevent us from identifying the effect of civic capital, which is time-invariant. To address
the endogeneity issue and still be able to identify the effects of time-invariant regressors,
we estimate equation (4) by the System GMM estimator for dynamic panel data models
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This approach builds, for each time period, a system
stacking two equations for the model in (4), one in first differences, i.e. the transformed
model, and one in levels, i.e. the original model. The system is estimated by GMM exploiting
moment conditions where lagged levels of the dependent variable are used as instruments
for the equations in first differences and lagged first-differences are used as instruments for
the equations in levels. The System GMM (SYS-GMM) approach has the advantage of
explicitly taking into account the unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and allowing for the
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identification of the effect of time-invariant regressors, while only requiring mean stationarity
of the initial conditions. We test the validity of the moment conditions exploited by the SYS-
GMM estimator using the Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions. The standard
errors are made robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the province level.
5 Results
5.1 Estimates of the static and dynamic specifications
In Table 2 we first present the pooled OLS estimates of equation (3). In each of the first
three columns, we exploit one of the three alternative proxies of civic capital at a time,
while column (4) shows the result for the model in which civic capital is measured by the
first principal component of the three proxies. In general, the estimated coefficients suggest
a positive relationship between the stock of provincial civic capital and firm-level PSI. The
relationship between civic capital and service outsourcing is statistically significant in the
case of referendum turnout and the first principal component of the three proxies. However,
when civic capital is measured through blood donations and volunteers the coefficient is not
statistically different from zero.
In columns (5) and (6) we report the pooled OLS estimates of a dynamic specification of
equation (3), where we add the one-year lag of the dependent variable to the set of regressors.
The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable points to a strong persistence of
firm-level PSI. There are several explanations for this result, ranging from organizational
sluggishness to the inertia created by the fact that contracts regulating service purchases
tend to span over many years. Results are consistent with the idea that civic capital favors
service outsourcing. However, the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable in a dynamic
framework where the estimation method is OLS poses a threat to the reliability of the results.
In columns (7) and (8) we present the SYS-GMM estimates of the dynamic specification
in equation (4). The lagged dependent variable is treated as endogenous, whereas the total
number of workers and level of capital are treated as predetermined, not strictly exogenous:
the set of instruments in levels for the first-difference equation includes lags t−3 and t−4 of
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the dependent variable and lags t− 1 through t− 4 of workers and capital; for the equation
in levels, we exploit for the first-difference instruments the same lag structure (lags t − 3
and t − 4 of the dependent variable, and lags t− 1 through t− 4 for workers and capital).
The instrument matrix is collapsed (Roodman, 2009) to limit the scope for instrument
proliferation.
The GMM estimates suggest a positive relationship between civic capital (proxied by
the referendum turnout and the principal component) and service outsourcing. The GMM
coefficients of civic capital are close in magnitude to the ones provided by the baseline pooled
OLS estimates of columns (1) and (4). In the case of the referendum turnout, an estimated
elasticity equal to 0.28 means that a 10% difference in the provincial turnout is associated
with a 2.8% firm-level difference in PSI. To give an idea of the economic magnitude of the
effect of civic capital when the measure is the first principal component we do the following
back-of-the-envelope calculations. An estimated coefficient equal to 0.02 implies that PSI
would be 10% larger if Naples had the same stock of civic capital of Milan. The actual
difference in the degree of service outsourcing in the data between firms located in Milan
and Naples is 9.9% (i.e. 22.6% vs. 12.7%).14
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Turning to the province-level controls, the size of the service market, measured by the
numbers of workers employed, has a statistically significant effects. It suggests that firms
in thick markets purchase relatively more services from external suppliers, in line with
the findings of Ono (2007). Regarding the firm-level controls, the number of employees
is negatively associated with PSI, pointing to the existence of economies of scale in the
production of services at the firm level. Since in-house production of services is subject to
fixed costs, smaller firms with lower service consumption outsource more. This result has
been found in other studies (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Merino and Rodrand, 2007). The
amount of fixed assets, given the other controls, is positively related to PSI. In this case, the
14The principal component for Naples is -3.347, while for Milan it is +1.236. The contribution from the
difference in civic capital to the difference of PSI in log terms for the two locations is then equal to 0.10,
which corresponds to a difference of roughly 10% in levels.
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rise in external service expenditure relative to sales could be due to an increased demand
for capital-related services, such as maintenance or repairing. The sign of the coefficient of
the age of the firm is unstable, and changes when we add the lag of the dependent variable
among the regressors.
SYS-GMM estimates confirm a very high persistence of the intensity of service out-
sourcing over time, the coefficient on the lagged dependent being around 0.8. The p-value
of the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions (p=0.11) shows the validity of the full
instrument set which is exploited by the SYS-GMM estimator.
5.2 Robustness checks
In Table 3 we present several robustness checks. In columns from (1) to (5) we display
the pooled OLS estimation of equation (3), while in columns from (6) to (10) we present
the GMM estimation of equation (4). From now on we will describe the results obtained
with the principal component of civic capital in the main text. Estimates with referendum
turnout can be found in the appendix B with supplementary material.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In columns (1) and (6) we allow nonlinearities in firm-level variables by including squared
controls. In the GMM specification, also squared controls are instrumented with appropriate
time lags. In columns (2) and (7) provincial GDP is included as an additional regressor,
while in columns (3) and (8) the provinces of Milan, Rome and Turin are excluded. Finally
columns (4) and (9) show results obtained restricting the sample to the firms belonging to
the manufacturing sector (NACE 15 to 36), and columns (5) and (10) to those operating
in services (NACE greater than 40, except industries mentioned in footnote 5). In all these
cases the coefficient of civic capital is statistically significant and stable compared to the
baseline estimates. Only for the pooled OLS estimates of PSI in manufacturing firms, column
(4), we get a civic capital coefficient that is not statistically different from zero. However,
the coefficient is statistically significant with the SYS-GMM estimator of column (9), and
in both the pooled OLS and SYS-GMM regressions obtained employing referendum turnout
20
instead of the principal component, which are reported in the appendix B. The p-value of
the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions is fairly low in some columns, and then
the validity of the full instrument set is not granted. However, also in these cases the point
estimate of the civic capital variable stays remarkably constant around a value of 0.02.
In section 3 we showed that PSI contributes in an inverse manner to the overall firm-level
degree of vertical integration, measured by value added over sales. We have also explained
why, given our interest in civic capital, PSI is the most appropriate measure to look at.
Nonetheless, it may be interesting to show what happens if we replace PSI with value added
over sales, given that this measure is widely used in the literature on outsourcing. We do so
in the appendix and find that, as expected, results are inconclusive. By adding transactions
involving material inputs to retrieve the overall degree of vertical integration, the incidence of
contractual hazards becomes less acute, especially in the case of homogenous raw materials.
Moreover, the exact location of the input supplier is uncertain, and consequently the right
level of civic capital that should be assigned to economic transactions is unclear. Therefore,
it comes as no surprise that the effect of civic capital is not statistically different from zero.
6 Assessing causal channels through historical instru-
ments
6.1 Motivation and identifying assumptions
The econometric specification in equation (3) assumes that, conditional on the covariates,
the stock of civic capital is uncorrelated with the error term ǫi,j,s,t. If this assumption is
not satisfied, we may get a spurious relationship between civic capital and PSI. Imagine a
thriving province with many service providers, and an efficient judiciary system, financial
sector, etc. In such a business environment, firms may have a high tendency to purchase
services from external suppliers. If economic prosperity fosters civic behaviour as well, we
may observe positive association between civic capital and PSI that does not follow from
a causal relationship. Similarly, inconsistent estimates may arise also if civic capital is
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measured with error even after extracting the principal component of our three proxies.
In the following, we address endogeneity concerns related to omitted variables or mea-
surement error by instrumenting civic capital with historical measures. We follow de Blasio and Nuzzo
(2010) and Bu¨rker and Minerva (2014) for the choice of historical instruments. Instrument-
ing civic capital with historical measures is a widely adopted strategy in the literature
aimed at establishing a causal relationship between civic capital and socio-economic out-
comes (de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2010; Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2016). Deeply lagged mea-
sures of civicness are natural candidates for instruments as civic behavior tends to be highly
persistent over time.
The first set of instruments that we use measures civicness through electoral turnout
in the 1920s and membership in mutual aid societies that emerged in the late 19th cen-
tury. Individuals that participate in political elections express a concern for common good.
Putnam (1993) argues that electoral turnout at the beginning of the 20th century is likely
to be driven by civic-minded behavior as voter turnout strongly correlates with other mea-
sures of social solidarity. The measure of electoral turnout in the 1920s, the first with male
universal suffrage, is an average of voter participation over two national elections from 1919
and 1921 and two communal elections from 1920.
As to mutual aid societies, they were created in the middle of the 19th century as a
response to the economic and social hardships brought about by industrialization. These
aid societies provided to their members basic services such as medical care and insurance
against work accidents. Putnam (1993) stresses that the disposition to cooperation necessary
for the functioning of mutual aid societies was sustained by mutual reciprocity rather than
formalized enforcement and monitoring. As such, they express values and beliefs similar
to the traits civic capital aims to capture. The importance of mutual aid societies at the
local level is measured by the membership rate, i.e. the number of members in mutual aid
societies per 100,000 inhabitants. This information is available at the regional level and
refers to the year 1873.
The second set of historical variables goes back to the Middle Age and captures in-
formation on the free city states that existed before 1300 in Northern Italy. Lacking any
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central power, free-city states were created by their citizens to address problems of common
interest, in particular to provide mutual security. These city states were characterized by
a high degree of civic participation in the political decision processes, at least for Middle
Age standards. The free-city state experience favored the creation of horizontal ties and
a strong sense of civic cooperation. Guiso et al. (2016) show how these cooperative values
and beliefs persist until today. Based on information provided in Guiso et al. (2008), we
count for each province the number of free-city states that existed before 1300. The result-
ing variable varies between 0 and 3. As the free-city states existed predominantly in the
North and Center of the Italian peninsula, the South and Islands are not included in the
regressions.15
In order to be valid, the instruments must affect PSI only through the contemporaneous
stock of civic capital. The empirical literature on civic capital has acknowledged that this
might not be straightforward (Durlauf, 2002; Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2011). The main
challenge is that the historical episodes that determined the accumulation of civic capital
might have also boosted other assets (e.g. the artistic heritage of cities) omitted from the
regression that persist until today and influence the outcome of interest. If this were the
case, the exclusion restriction would be violated and the instruments would no longer be
valid. We address this concern in the following manner. First, while most of the literature
aims at assessing the link between civicness and economic development, here we study
outsourcing of business services. Dealing with a specific firm-level outcome mitigates the
risk of violation of the exclusion restriction. As we focus on a narrow dimension of firm
activity such as outsourcing decisions, the explanatory variables included in the regression
should capture all relevant factors affecting the outcome. Second, we include the provincial
degree of urbanization in 1861 as an additional control. Mutual aid societies predominantly
insured against economic and social calamities craftsmen and artisans living in cities. As
such, they were mostly an urban phenomenon. Hence, including historical urbanization
in 1861 among the regressors improves the reliability of the instrument with respect to the
15Specifically, the regions of Campania, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia are
dropped.
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exclusion restriction, because it wipes out confounding factors related to urbanization at the
time the instrument were measured. By the same token, historic urbanization may capture
unobserved provincial characteristics, correlated with the presence of free-city states in the
Middle Age, that affect the current stock of civic capital.
6.2 Results with historical instruments
In column (1) of Table 4 we present the estimates of equation (3) where the regional fixed
effects have been replaced with dummies for the five macro-regions of the country: North-
West, North-East, Center, South, and Islands. This choice is motivated by the fact that the
data on mutual aid societies and turnout in the 1920s are available only at the regional level.
In addition to that, in column (2), Southern regions are excluded from the estimating sample
for comparability with the regressions involving free-city states. Compared to the baseline
regression, the coefficient of civic capital in column (1) is larger in magnitude, possibly due
to the inclusion of macro-region dummies. When excluding the South and the islands, the
sample variation in civic capital and overall socio-economic performance is substantially
reduced. Column (2) shows that the results are robust to such an exclusion, supporting the
overall reliability of our findings. Column (3) presents the dynamic counterpart of column
(2), estimated by SYS-GMM: the high persistence of service outsourcing is confirmed, as
well as the role of civic capital.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
To address potential endogeneity of civic capital, we adopt an IV approach which exploits
the historical instruments presented above. The first set of instrumental variables for civic
capital includes the electoral turnout in the 1920s and the number of mutual aid societies.
We first rely on two-stage least squares (2SLS), and we include in both stages the full set
of covariates augmented with urbanization in 1861. In columns (4) through (6) we employ
the two IVs, both separately and jointly. The first stage estimates, reported in Panel B,
present a positive sign for the IV coefficients and point to the relevance of the accumulated
stock of civic capital over time in determining current civicness. With respect to the rele-
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vance of the IVs, the F-statistics for the excluded instruments is large and both variables are
jointly significant.16 The second stage results are reported in Panel A. A positive and sig-
nificant estimated coefficient for civic capital suggests that civicness favors business service
outsourcing of firms in line with the OLS estimates, but the magnitude of the 2SLS coeffi-
cient is larger. IV coefficients larger than the corresponding OLS estimates are frequently
found in the related literature (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2016;
Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017). Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2017) argue that the increase is likely to be driven by measurement error. This would imply
that even after extracting the principal component, civic capital is still noisily measured,
thus introducing a downward bias in OLS. Hence, the 2SLS estimation helps to identify
the true impact of civic capital on service outsourcing of firms. A possible alternative ex-
planation for larger estimated coefficients is that the instruments affect service outsourcing
through channels other than civic capital, even after conditioning on historical urbanization
and the other regressors. To further investigate this issue, we estimate the outcome model by
SYS-GMM, using the historical IVs (turnout in 1920s and number of mutual aid societies).
Column (7) reports the GMM estimates of equation (4) for the full sample adding histori-
cal urbanization to the regressors. The results are consistent with the corresponding 2SLS
estimates, the most remarkable findings being the high persistence of outsourcing and the
relevance of civicness, even once the dynamics is accounted for. We test the validity of the
full set of overidentifying restrictions by means of the Hansen test: a p-value of 0.15 points
to the validity of the IVs. Most notably, the Difference-in-Hansen test on the historical IVs
(p-value 0.596) supports the choice of our exclusion restrictions.17
Finally, in the last two columns we instrument civic capital with the number of free-city
states that existed before 1300 in each province. The 2SLS results from the first stage,
reported in column (8), show that the instrumental variables are relevant. The presence of
a free-city state in a province significantly increases the stock of civic capital compared to
provinces with no free-cities. The increase in the current stock of civic capital is even larger
16As for identification, the Kleibergen-Paap and Anderson-Rubin test statistics point to a genuine model
identification. These tests are not reported in the table to save on space.
17This test is not reported in the table to save on space.
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if the province hosted two free-city states.18 The three instrumental variables are jointly
significant with a satisfactory F-statistic. The second stage results in panel A confirm
previous findings. Even when instrumented with historical events dating back to the late
Middle Age, civic capital positively affects contemporary service outsourcing of firms. The
magnitude of the estimated 2SLS coefficient is slightly smaller than its OLS counterpart
of column (2). Column (9) presents System GMM estimates similar to those in column
(3), with the addition of free-city dummies among the excluded instruments. The exclusion
restrictions are valid, as confirmed by the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions and
by an unreported Difference-in-Hansen test on historical IVs.
Overall, the historical IV regressions produce a coherent picture, independently of whether
we instrument civic capital with measures of civic participation that refer to the first decades
after the Italian unification or with historical events that occurred during the Middle Age.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence that civic capital shapes the firms’ intensity of
service outsourcing. The results can be attributed to the fact that, in more civic areas, the
incidence of opportunistic behavior on the part of the contracting parties is reduced, and
this is something which improves contractual outcomes and sustains more market exchange
between independent firms.
Understanding the firm’s choice of whether to produce a given input or purchase it
from external suppliers is a fundamental concern in economics. Despite several influential
theories and a huge amount of empirical studies, the pronounced differences that exist in the
organization of production of firms are not yet fully understood. Analyzing the importance
of informal institutions, and in particular the role of cooperative values that prevail in a
given area, might advance our understanding of the determinants of the costs of contracting,
18We are not particularly worried by the fact that having three free cities in 1300 is not statistically
related to a higher level of civic capital today. Notice that there are just three provinces with 3 free-city
states (Alessandria, Cuneo and Turin) and they are all located in Piedmont. We believe that there is not
enough variability to warrant the identification of the free-city effect in this case.
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a crucial aspect at the heart of most of the theoretical contributions in this field.
At the same time our analysis sheds some light on why civic capital spurs aggregate
economic performance. While in general it is not straightforward to establish a direct
relationship between firms’ organization and performance, there is some evidence that firms
might benefit from greater service outsourcing. Intuitively, outsourcing allows to concentrate
on core activities and to benefit from greater specialization. Similarly, firms that produce
a wider range of inputs might face larger governance costs associated with running a less
specialized organization. These effects might be particularly pronounced for services, which
are often ancillary inputs with respect to the main product line. Our paper uncovers a
channel that helps to explain the positive effect of civic capital on service outsourcing and,
consequently, aggregate economic performance.
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A Appendix
A.1 Detailed description of the data
A.1.1 Definition of Purchased Services
Under the Italian accounting system, the exact amount of purchased services is reported in
a specific item in the profit and loss account of each firm in the section dedicated to the
costs of production. This item contains all the services expenses coming from ordinary firm
29
activity. The list that follows provides some of the most common services purchases: Travel
and accommodation expenses - Repairing and maintenance carried out by external firms
- Intermediate production stages outsourced to external firms - Advising in the technical,
legal, fiscal, administrative, commercial and accounting fields - Advertising and marketing
- Commissions and reimbursement of expenses for agents and representatives - Vigilance
and security - Cleaning - Remunerations and reimbursements paid to administrators and
auditors - Costs for the personnel temporary hired from other firms - Costs for the canteen,
nursery school, holiday camps, employees clubs, etc. (these costs are net of the amount of
money that is to charged to employees) - Costs for luncheon vouches distributed to employees
- Costs for refresher courses for employees - Costs for board and lodging of employees in
secondment - Electricity, telephone, fax, water, gas, and other utilities. The item B7 also
lists costs for services provided by banks and financial agencies different from true financial
charges. Those include: rental fees for safe-deposit boxes, service payments for utilization
fees, costs for safe-keeping of bonds, commissions for bond bails (if not held to obtain
financing), expenses and commissions for factoring (excluding financial charges), expenses
for valuation of real estates to obtain loans, expenses for preliminary investigations of real
estates and financing (in general, all those expenses different from interests and discounts,
commissions of financing and bank charges and their collateral.)
A.1.2 Measures or instruments for civic capital
Referenda turnout : It is the average provincial electoral turnout for the referenda on the
choice between republic and monarchy (1946), divorce (1974), public financing of political
parties (1978), public security and anti-terrorism measures (1981), abortion (1981), wage es-
calator regulations (1985) and nuclear power and hunting regulations (1987). The following
eight provinces were created after 1995: Biella, Lecco, Lodi, Rimini, Prato, Crotone, Vibo
Valentia, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola. The provinces to which they belonged before 1995 and
whose value has been assigned to them appear in parenthesis: Biella (Vercelli), Lecco (sim-
ple average of Bergamo and Como), Lodi (Milan), Rimini (Forl`ı-Cesena), Prato (Firenze),
Crotone (Catanzaro), Vibo Valentia (Catanzaro), Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (Novara). The
source of data for referendum turnout is the Ministry of the Interior.
Blood donations : The number of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants, disaggregated
by province. The data are collected from the health authorities of Italian regions. In each
region, regional health authorities collect data on blood donations and subsequently send
this information to the High Institute for Health (Istituto Superiore di Sanita`) which, in
turn, maintains a National and Regional Registry of Blood and Plasma. Provincial data
on blood donations are not available for Apulia and Lazio. For the provinces of these two
regions we take the total regional value. Data refer to the year 2002 and the source is
Cartocci (2007).
Volunteers : It is the number of volunteers in non-profit organizations. Data refer to the
year 2000 and the source is de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010).
Turnout in 1920s : It is the average electoral turnout at the regional level in the national
elections of 1919 and 1921, provincial elections in 1920 and communal elections in 1920.
There is no data for the regions of Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia
Giulia. We adopt the values of Piedmont for Valle d’Aosta, the region from which it was split
off. For the latter two regions, we adopt the values of Veneto, which is socio-geographically
the closest one. The source of these data is Putnam (1993).
Mutual aid societies in 1873 : It is the number of the members in mutual aid societies
in 1873 at the regional level, standardized by 100,000 inhabitants. Data for Valle d’Aosta,
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Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia are missing. We adopt the values of Piedmont
for Valle d’Aosta, the region from where it was split off. For the latter two regions, we adopt
the values of Veneto, which is socio-geographically the closest one. Additionally, there is no
data for Molise, for which we take the value of Abruzzo, the region from where it was split
off. The source is Putnam (1993).
Number of free-city states in 1300 : It is the number of free-city state experiences in the
territory of each province in 1300. Data are from Guiso et al. (2008). In order to reduce the
cost of collecting historical data at the town level, the authors analyze the history of the
400 biggest cities in terms of 1871 population in the area that was under the Holy Roman
Empire at the beginning of the second Millennium (basically, the Center-North of Italy).
A.1.3 Other provincial explanatory variables
Service workers : It is the number of total service workers in the province. We take this
information from the universe of Italian enterprises coming from Archivio Statistico delle
Imprese Attive (Statistical Archive of Active Enterprises) administered by Istat. The data
refer to the years from 2001 to 2007 and are extracted for the interval of two-digit industries
50-74.
Total workers : It is the number of total workers in the province (full-time equivalent of
workers hired in every sector). We take this information from Istat. The data refer to the
years from 2001 to 2007 (http://www3.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non calendario/20100114 00/).
University graduates : It is the number of university graduates per 100 inhabitants,
disaggregated by province. Data are from Istat.
Bank branches : It is the number of bank branches per 10,000 inhabitants, disaggregated
by province. Data are from the Bank of Italy’s Base Informativa Pubblica.
Length of labor trials : It is the number of days it takes to complete a first degree trial
in labor affairs in each of the 165 Italian labor courts. The data refer to the years from
1995 to 2001 (earlier years are not available) and are provided by Istat in the data base
Territorial Information System on Justice (Sistema Informativo Territoriale sulla Giustizia).
Since there are more courts than provinces and since in some cases the territory of a court
belongs to two different provinces we proceed as follows. First, we assign to each city in the
province the value of the court to which the city belongs. This information is then averaged
over all the cities belonging to the same province to get a provincial variable.
GDP : It is the provincial nominal gross domestic product, expressed in thousands of
euros. The source is Istat.
Urbanization in 1861 : This variable is the share of total provincial population living in
cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants in 1861. Data on city size come from the “Italian
Urban Population Database 1300-1861”, provided by Paolo Malanima
(http://www.paolomalanima.it/default file/Page646.htm). The number of total provincial
population in 1861 is taken from Populstat (http://www.populstat.info/).
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Figure 1: Average PSI across provinces (in level).
Figure 2: The figure plots the provincial average of firm-level residuals of a regression of
PSI on 3-digit industry dummies.
32
Figure 3: Map of civic capital measured by the first principal component of blood donations,
volunteering, and electoral turnout.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Firm-level variables
PSI (log) 877,736 2.91 0.94 -8.16 6.08 2.34 3.00 3.55
Employees (log) 877,736 2.18 1.35 0 12.20 1.10 2.08 3.04
Capital (log) 877,736 11.91 2.12 0 23.82 10.50 11.84 13.35
Firm age (log) 877,736 2.37 0.95 0 6.81 1.79 2.48 3.09
Value added / Sales (log) 858,371 3.11 0.82 -10.40 5.52 2.64 3.21 3.68
Civic capital variables
Referenda turnout (log) 103 4.39 0.11 4.13 4.52 4.30 4.42 4.47
Blood donations (log) 103 3.57 0.42 2.50 4.44 3.26 3.64 3.84
Volunteers (log) 103 8.53 0.63 7.10 10.01 8.15 8.60 8.93
Principal component 103 0 1.5 -3.35 2.31 -1.23 0.44 1.13
Historical variables
Aid societies in 1873 (log) 20 4.03 0.09 3.82 4.21 3.97 4.03 4.08
Turnout in 1920s (log) 20 6.25 0.98 4.16 7.47 5.41 6.54 7.07
Number of free-city states 67 0.85 0.78 0 3 0 1 1
Other explanatory variables
Service workers (log) 721 10.75 0.86 8.79 14.03 10.18 10.66 11.18
Total workers (log) 721 12.04 0.74 10.42 14.54 11.57 11.94 12.44
University graduates (log) 103 1.85 0.18 1.46 2.45 1.73 1.85 1.93
Bank branches (log) 103 1.59 0.44 -0.66 2.33 1.27 1.72 1.91
Length of trials (log) 103 6.94 0.34 6.19 7.72 6.72 6.92 7.18
GDP (log) 103 15.79 0.80 14.05 18.57 15.23 15.71 16.24
Note: The table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. The dependent vari-
able, PSI (log), is the log of purchased service intensity, defined as the amount spent on external service
provision divided by sales. Employees (log) is the log of the number of employees. Capital (log) is the log of
the firms’ capital stock, defined as total tangible fixed assets. Firm age (log) is the log of the firm age. Value
added / Sales (log) is the log of firm value added divided by sales. All firm level variables are taken from
AIDA and refer to the years from 2001 to 2007. We consider the following variables to measure civic capital:
Referenda turnout is the log of the average electoral turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Blood do-
nations is the log of the number of blood donations per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002; Volunteers is the log of
the number of volunteers in non-profit institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Principal component is
the first principal component of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital. The historical instruments
are: Turnout in 1920s is the the log of turnout in the elections that took place in Italy in the 1920s; Aid
societies in 1873 is the log of the members of mutual aid societies per 100,000 inhabitants in 1873; Number
of free-city states is the number of free-city states in the territory of each province in 1300. The provincial
controls are the following: Service workers (log) is the log of total service workers in a given province (NACE
rev 1.1 two digit industries 50-74) Total workers (log) is the log of all workers in a given province (full-time
equivalent of workers hired in every sector); University graduates is the log of the share of university grad-
uates over total population; Bank branches is the log of the number of bank branches per 1000 inhabitants;
Length of trials is the log of the number of days it takes to complete a first-degree trial in civil affairs; GDP
(log) is the log of the provincial nominal gross domestic product.
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Table 2: Baseline regressions
Pooled OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Referenda turnout (log) 0.529*** 0.098** 0.284***
(0.140) (0.038) (0.091)
Blood donations (log) 0.008
(0.020)
Volunteers (log) 0.015
(0.016)
Principal component 0.023** 0.008*** 0.022***
(0.010) (0.002) (0.007)
Employees (log) -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.088*** -0.089***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007)
Capital (log) 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm age (log) -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Service workers (log) 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.010***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Length of trials (log) -0.000 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.002 -0.034*** -0.028***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010)
Bank branches (log) 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
University graduates (log) -0.008 0.033 0.029 0.015 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017)
PSIt−1 (log) 0.753*** 0.753*** 0.837*** 0.838***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.053) (0.054)
3-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
R2 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.768 0.768
Hansen J -test 17.01 16.95
Hansen p-value 0.11 0.11
Observations 877,736 877,736 877,736 877,736 493,153 493,153 493,153 493,153
Note: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering at the province
level. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. We use the following variables to
measure civic capital: Referenda turnout is the log of the average electoral turnout in referenda between 1946
and 1987; Blood donations is the log of the number of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants in 2002; Volun-
teers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-profit institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Principal
component is the first principal component of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital. We include
the following firm-level controls: Employees is the log of the total number of employees; Capital is the log
of the firms’ capital stock, defined as total tangible fixed assets; Firm age is the log of the firm age. We in-
clude the following provincial controls: Service workers is the log of total service workers in a given province
(NACE rev 1.1 two digit industries 50-74); Length of trials is the log of the number of days it takes to com-
plete a first-degree trial in labor-related affairs; Bank branches is the log of the number of bank branches per
1,000 inhabitants; University graduates is the log of the share of university graduates over total population.
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Table 3: Robustness checks
Pooled OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Principal component 0.022** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.009 0.026** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.016**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Employees (log) -0.090*** -0.051*** -0.056*** -0.024*** -0.063*** -0.148*** -0.088*** -0.090*** -0.067*** -0.102***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Employees (log), squared 0.009*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.003)
Capital (log) 0.081*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.044** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008 0.011**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Capital (log), squared -0.002*** -0.002*
(0.000) (0.001)
Firm age (log) 0.013 -0.008*** -0.006* 0.001 -0.006 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Firm age (log), squared -0.004** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Service workers (log) 0.041*** -0.029 0.053*** 0.022*** 0.051*** 0.008** -0.020 0.011*** 0.006 0.009**
(0.007) (0.031) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Length of trials (log) 0.008 0.006 -0.019 0.016 -0.015 -0.023* -0.023** -0.024* -0.027** -0.020*
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Bank branches (log) 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.008 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
University graduates (log) 0.016 0.037 0.022 -0.037 0.028 0.008 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.027
(0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.046) (0.035) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
GDP (log) 0.081** 0.032*
(0.033) (0.018)
PSIt−1 (log) 0.779*** 0.838*** 0.798*** 0.779*** 0.869***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.066) (0.059)
3-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
R2 0.355 0.355 0.361 0.174 0.395
Hansen J -test 32.34 17.06 25.83 20.09 16.05
Hansen p-value 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.14
Observations 877,736 877,736 666,260 291,465 566,549 493,153 493,153 375,441 177,711 304,658
Note: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering at the province level. ***,**,* denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. To measure civic capital we use Principal component, the first principal com-
ponent of the three proxies of civic capital. We include the following firm-level controls (both in levels and squared): Employees is
the log of the total number of employees; Capital is the log of the firms’ capital stock, defined as total tangible fixed assets; Firm
age is the log of the firm age. We include the following provincial controls: Service workers is the log of total service workers in a
given province (NACE rev 1.1 two digit industries 50-74); Length of trials is the log of the number of days it takes to complete a
first-degree trial in labor-related affairs; Bank branches is the log of the number of bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants; Univer-
sity graduates is the log of the share of university graduates over total population; GDP is the log of the provincial nominal gross
domestic product, expressed in thousands of euros.
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Table 4: Estimates with historical instruments
Panel A: Second Stage (Dependent variable: Log of PSI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS (no South) GMM (no South) 2SLS-1 2SLS-2 2SLS-3 GMM 2SLS GMM
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Principal component 0.063*** 0.074*** 0.014** 0.087*** 0.073*** 0.082*** 0.023** 0.077*** 0.017***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) (0.018) (0.006)
Size (log) -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.093*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.088*** -0.050*** -0.092***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Capital (log) 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.006 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Firm age (log) -0.007** -0.013*** 0.036*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.033*** -0.013*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Province service workers (log) 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.009**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Length of trials (log) -0.044 -0.018 -0.024** -0.028 -0.039 -0.031 -0.023** -0.015 -0.017***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.010) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.010) (0.031) (0.006)
Bank branches (log) 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
University graduates (log) 0.056 0.040 -0.013 0.042 0.048 0.044 0.003 0.044 -0.014
(0.044) (0.044) (0.017) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.015) (0.046) (0.013)
Urbanization rate in 1861 (log) -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 -0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
PSIt−1 0.815*** 0.840*** 0.853***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.052)
3-digit dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Macro-regional dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Firm level covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.354 0.336 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.337
Obs. 877,736 708,659 409,475 877,736 877,736 877,736 493,153 708,659 409,475
Hansen J-test 14.41 17.05 14.80
Hansen p-value 0.21 0.15 0.32
Panel B: First Stage (Dependent variable: Principal component)
Turnout 1920s (log) 5.488*** 4.155***
(1.000) (1.198)
Mutual aid societies (log) 1.059*** 0.550**
(0.216) (0.258)
1 free-city in 1300 0.449***
(0.146)
2 free-city in 1300 0.782***
(0.160)
3 free-city in 1300 -0.141
(0.221)
F-stat of excluded instr. 30.10 24.08 16.97 12.54
F-stat p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 877,736 877,736 877,736 708,659
Note: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering at the province level. ***,**,*
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Panel A shows the second stage, while Panel B shows the first
stage. In the first stage we use two sets of instrumental variables. The first set of instrumental variables are: Aid societies
in 1873 is the log of the members of mutual aid societies per 100,000 inhabitants in 1873; Turnout in 1920s is the the log
of turnout in the elections that took place in Italy in the 1920s. The second set of instrumental variables are dummies
for the number of free-city states at the provincial level in 1300.
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B Appendix with supplementary material
This appendix contains some supplementary material for our paper.
Robustness checks employing referendum turnout as main regres-
sor
In Tables B-1 and B-2 we replicate the robustness checks and the regressions with histor-
ical instruments employing referendum turnout as main regressor, instead of the principal
component. The results are perfectly in line with those showed in the main text.
Alternative measure of outsourcing as dependent variable
According to our conceptual framework, civic capital should boost input outsourcing, thus
leading to a reduction in the degree of vertical integration. In Table B-3 we present the
estimates for pooled OLS and GMM regressions where the dependent variable is the log-
arithm of value added over sales. The regressors employed are the same of the baseline
model, except the provincial control for the total number of workers, where we employ the
full-time equivalent of the total number of workers hired by every sector, instead of the total
number of workers hired by the service sector. This change is done because controlling only
for local service workers would be less appropriate with value added over sales as dependent
variable, since this is a more general measure that may be influenced by the availability of
a wider array of inputs, not only services.
Results obtained replacing value added over sales as dependent are inconclusive. Our
explanation for this is based on the fact that, according to equation (2), value added over
sales is affected not only PSI, but also by PII (i.e. material inputs outsourcing) and by other
types of external purchases. As we argued, in the case of material goods the location of the
input seller is more uncertain, because he may well be located in another province or abroad,
with the input being shipped to the buyer’s address from a possibly distant place. When
the buyer and the seller of the input do not share the same location, identifying the effect
of civic capital on contractual hazards and the propensity to outsource is cumbersome.
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Table B-1: Robustness checks with referendum turnout as main regressor
Pooled OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Referenda turnout (log) 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.498*** 0.622*** 0.446*** 0.384*** 0.281*** 0.352*** 0.330*** 0.194**
(0.140) (0.131) (0.130) (0.160) (0.146) (0.095) (0.090) (0.091) (0.114) (0.078)
Size (log) -0.090*** -0.051*** -0.056*** -0.023*** -0.063*** -0.148*** -0.088*** -0.090*** -0.067*** -0.102***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Size (log), squared 0.009*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.003)
Capital (log) 0.081*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.045** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008 0.011**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Capital (log), squared -0.002*** -0.002*
(0.000) (0.001)
Firm age (log) 0.013 -0.008*** -0.006* 0.000 -0.006 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Firm age (log), squared -0.004** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Province service workers (log) 0.047*** -0.016 0.056*** 0.029*** 0.056*** 0.007* -0.006 0.010** 0.004 0.008*
(0.007) (0.031) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Length of trials (log) -0.000 -0.001 -0.021 0.002 -0.018 -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.028** -0.029*** -0.028*
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
Bank branches (log) 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
University graduates (log) -0.008 0.012 0.003 -0.075 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.016 0.018 0.029
(0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049) (0.038) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022)
GDP (log) 0.072** 0.015
(0.033) (0.015)
PSIt−1 (log) 0.778*** 0.837*** 0.798*** 0.772*** 0.867***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.068) (0.059)
3-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
R2 0.356 0.355 0.361 0.174 0.395
Hansen J -test 32.55 17.05 25.81 20.09 16.05
Hansen p-value 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.14
Observations 877,736 877,736 666,260 291,465 566,549 493,153 493,153 375,441 177,711 304,658
Note: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering at the province level. ***,**,* denote sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. To measure civic capital we use Referendum turnout, the log of the average electoral
turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987. We include the following firm-level controls: Employees is the log of the total number of
employees; Capital is the log of the firms’ capital stock, defined as total tangible fixed assets; Firm age is the log of the firm age. We
include the following provincial controls: Service workers is the log of total service workers in a given province (NACE rev 1.1 two digit
industries 50-74); Length of trials is the log of the number of days it takes to complete a first-degree trial in labor-related affairs; Bank
branches is the log of the number of bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants; University graduates is the log of the share of university
graduates over total population; GDP is the log of the provincial nominal gross domestic product, expressed in thousands of euros.
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Table B-2: Estimates with historical instruments and referendum turnout as main regressor
Panel A: Second Stage (Dependent variable: Log of PSI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS OLS (no South) GMM (no South) 2SLS-1 2SLS-2 2SLS-3 GMM 2SLS GMM
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Referenda turnout (log) 0.775*** 0.835*** 0.178* 1.327*** 0.806*** 1.103*** 0.265*** 1.724*** 0.331**
(0.132) (0.201) (0.106) (0.277) (0.290) (0.256) (0.091) (0.569) (0.135)
Size (log) -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.091*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.087*** -0.050*** -0.090***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
Capital (log) 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.007** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Firm age (log) -0.007** -0.013*** 0.034*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.032*** -0.013*** 0.034***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Province service workers (log) 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.010** 0.024** 0.022*** 0.023** 0.008** 0.025** 0.011***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004)
Length of trials (log) -0.086*** -0.090*** -0.031** -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.032*** -0.074** -0.030***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.012) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.011) (0.032) (0.009)
Bank branches (log) 0.015 0.018 -0.000 0.008 0.014 0.011 0.001 0.013 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.004)
University graduates (log) 0.063 0.035 -0.012 0.045 0.062 0.053 0.004 0.020 -0.023
(0.049) (0.053) (0.019) (0.056) (0.050) (0.053) (0.016) (0.059) (0.018)
PSIt−1 (log) 0.818*** 0.846*** 0.834***
(0.046) (0.051) (0.047)
3-digit dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Macro-regional dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Firm level covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.354 0.336 0.353 0.354 0.353 0.335
Obs. 876,700 707,702 409,889 876,700 876,700 876,700 493,585 707,702 409,889
Hansen J -test 13.99 16.93 14.50
Hansen p-value 0.23 0.15 0.34
Panel B: First Stage (Dependent variable: Principal component)
Turnout 1920s (log) 0.386*** 0.272***
(0.063) (0.065)
Mutual Societies (log) 0.081*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.016)
1 free-city in 1300 0.022
(0.015)
2 free-city in 1300 0.029**
(0.015)
3 free-city in 1300 -0.013
(0.018)
F-stat of excluded instr. 30.10 24.08 16.97 12.54
F-stat (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm level covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 877,736 877,736 877,736 708,659
Note: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering at the province level. ***,**,* denote sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Panel A shows the second stage, while Panel B shows the first stage. In the first stage
we use two sets of instrumental variables. The first set of instrumental variables are: Aid societies in 1873 is the log of the members of
mutual aid societies per 100,000 inhabitants in 1873; Turnout in 1920s is the the log of turnout in the elections that took place in Italy
in the 1920s. The second set of instrumental variables are dummies for the number of free-city states at the provincial level in 1300.
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Table B-3: Value added over sales as dependent variable
Pooled OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Referenda turnout (log) 0.191 -0.106
(0.138) (0.125)
Principal component 0.011 -0.000
(0.007) (0.009)
Employees (log) 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.036*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Capital (log) 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.009* -0.009*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm age (log) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.017** 0.016**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Total workers (log) -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
Length of trials (log) -0.029 -0.027 -0.044 -0.034
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029)
Bank branches (log) -0.018** -0.019** -0.023 -0.029
(0.007) (0.008) (0.022) (0.029)
University graduates (log) 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.045 0.041
(0.035) (0.032) (0.043) (0.043)
VA over salest−1 (log) 0.411*** 0.412***
(0.024) (0.024)
3-digit dummies Yes Yes No No
Regional dummies Yes Yes No No
R2 0.335 0.335
Observations 858,371 858,371 480,979 480,979
Hansen J-test 53.49 53.84
Hansen p-value 0.00 0.00
Note: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and corrected for clus-
tering at the province level. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, re-
spectively. We use the following variables to measure civic capital: Referenda turnout
is the log of the average electoral turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Princi-
pal component is the first principal component of the three proxies of civic capital. We
include the following firm-level controls: Employees is the log of the total number of
employees; Capital is the log of the firms’ capital stock, defined as total tangible fixed
assets; Firm age is the log of the firm age. We include the following provincial controls:
Total workers is the log of the total number of workers in a given province; Length of
trials is the log of the number of days it takes to complete a first-degree trial in labor-
related affairs; Bank branches is the log of the number of bank branches per 1,000 in-
habitants; University graduates is the log of the share of university graduates over total
population.
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